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1.	  INTRODUCTION	  	  
	  
	  
1.1	  Context	  	  
1.1.1	  The	  European	  Union	  Emissions	  Trading	  System	  	  	  The	  European	  Union	  Emissions	  Trading	  System	  (EU	  ETS)	   is	   the	   first	  European	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  system	  of	  allowances.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  is	  to	  reach	  a	  reduction	  from	  a	  certain	   level	  of	  emissions	   in	  a	  cost-­‐effective	  way.	  This	  European	  system	  is	  currently	  the	  world’s	   largest	   emission	   trading	   scheme	   and	   represents	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   the	  European	  Climate	  Change	  Programme.	  	  
 
1.1.2	  International	  Aviation	  
	  Carbon	   emissions	   generated	   from	   international	   aviation	   showed	   an	   85%	   rising	   [1]	  from	   1990	   to	   2004	  with	   a	   4.4%	   traffic	   increasing	   [2]	   average	   from	   1990	   to	   2008,	  which	   is	   expected	   to	   augment	   during	   the	   coming	   years.	   In	   2008,	   to	   control	   CO2	  emissions	   from	   the	   aviation	   sector,	   the	   European	   Commission,	   the	   European	  Parliament	   and	   the	   European	   Council	   agreed	   on	   including	   the	   international	  
aviation	  sector	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS,	  which	  as	  far	  as	  then	  was	  limited	  to	  fixed	  installations	  
2	  	  
[3].	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  1	  January	  2012	  when	  emissions	  from	  international	  aviation	  flights	  were	  regulated	  under	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  	  
	  
	  
1.1.3	  The	  Cap-­‐and-­‐Trade	  System	  
	  To	   reduce	   annual	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions,	   the	  EU	  ETS	   is	   ruled	  under	   a	   Cap-­‐and-­‐Trade	   system	   split	   between	   international	   aviation	   sector	   and	   fixed	   installations	  sector.	  The	  cap	  is	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  emission	  allowances	  allocated	  during	  a	  concrete	  period	  of	  time	  where	  an	  allowance	  right	  equals	  to	  one	  tonne	  of	  CO21.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Or	  other	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  with	  the	  same	  equivalence	  to	  one	  tonne	  of	  CO2.	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Second	  Trading	  Period	  	  
Figure	  1.C	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  2	  	  	  100%	  
CAP	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To	  establish	  the	  cap	  for	  the	  international	  aviation	  sector,	  the	  Commission	  taking	  the	  role	   as	   the	   Regulator,	   obtains	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   historical	   emissions	   from	   the	  average	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  generated	  under	  the	  EU	  ETS	  scope	  between	  the	  years	   2004,	   2005,	   and	   2006.	   The	   quantity	   of	   historical	   emissions	   estimated	   [4],	   is	  used	   as	   a	   base	   line	   reference	   to	   calculate	   the	   posterior	   caps’	   level	   for	   each	  trading	  period	  (Fig.	  1.A).	  	  	  The	  initial	  cap	  established	  for	  the	  first	  trading	  period	  (2012),	  was	  set	  at	  a	  3%	   level	  
below	   the	   amount	   of	   historical	   emissions	  certified,	   i.e.	   97%	  of	  historic	   aviation	  emissions	   (Fig.	   1.B).	   Therefore,	   the	   Regulator	   distributed	   the	   allowances	   that	  conformed	   the	   cap	   between	   the	   operators;	   85%	   free	   of	   allocation	   and	   15%	   under	  auctioning.	  	  	  In	   the	  second	  trading	  period	  (2013-­‐2020),	   the	  cap	   is	  set	  a	  5%	  below	   the	   baseline	  
year.	  In	  the	  second	  period	  and	  for	  each	  year;	  3%	  of	  the	  allowances	  are	  distributed	  to	  new	   entrants,	   free	   allocation	   is	   decreased	   to	   82%	   and	   auctioning	   is	  maintained	   in	  15%	  (Fig.	  1.C).	  	  	  
	  
	  
1.2	  Motivation	  of	  the	  research	  	  	  Apparently,	   the	   caps	   set	   by	   the	   Regulator	   remain	   fixed	   but	   with	   an	   option	   for	   the	  airline	  operator	  to	  exceed	  it	  when	  the	  number	  of	  rights	  obtained	  does	  not	  cover	  the	  total	   amount	   of	   emissions	   generated	   by	   the	   airline	   operator.	   As	   a	   consequence	   of	  surpassing	   the	   cap	  with	   extra-­‐emissions,	   the	   operators	   receive	   a	   fine	   (currently	   of	  100€	  per	  tonne	  emitted	  [5]).	  	  	  
That	  fact	  presents	  the	  motivation	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  price	  per	  
extra-­‐emission	  emitted	  should	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  real	  fine	  (i.e.	  disincentive)	  or	  
it	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  emission	  tax/price	  that	  is	  paid	  for	  the	  additional	  
emissions	  beyond	  the	  initial	  endowment	  of	  allowances?	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Moreover,	  which	   effect	  will	   have	  on	   the	   airline	  operators	   establishing	   a	   fixed	  
emission	  price/fine	  with	  no	  adjustment	  regarding	  if	  is	  affordable	  or	  not	  for	  the	  
operators?	  	  Therefore,	   a	   growing	   demand	   from	   aviation	   transport	   is	   expected	   for	   the	   coming	  years,	  fact	  that	  sets	  another	  doubt;	  will	  the	  cap	  remain	  fixed	  or	  it	  will	  be	  adjusted	  
to	   the	   air	   traffic	   growth	   requests?	   If	   the	   cap	   remains	   fixed,	   it	   could	   severely	  penalize	  the	  traffic	  demand,	  with	  the	  consequent	  macroeconomic	  costs,	  unless	  a	  big	  technological	   change	   in	   aircraft	   engines	   and	   energetic	   technologies	   is	   expected	   to	  occur	  in	  the	  coming	  years.	  	  	  
1.3	  Objectives	  	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   project	   is	   to	   recognize	   which	   possible	   economic	   consequences	  
could	  have	  for	  the	  European	  airline	  operators	  being	  subject	  under	  the	  Cap-­‐and-­‐
Trade	   System	   where	   emissions	   are	   traded	   as	   allowances.	   Consequently	  
understand	   and	   analyse	   which	   possible	   effect	   could	   have	   on	   the	   operators	  
paying	   a	   static	   tax	   for	   the	   extra	   emissions	   generated	   that	   cannot	   be	   covered	  
with	  tradable	  rights.	  	  	  Therefore,	  to	  accomplish	  the	  main	  objective,	  a	  serial	  of	  sub-­‐objectives	  are	  proposed:	  	   1.	   Understand	   what	   the	   EU	   ETS	   for	   international	   aviation	   is	   and	   which	   is	   the	  overarching	  objective	  of	  the	  system.	  	  	  2.	   Identify	   and	   understand	   how	   the	   key	   elements	   that	   conform	   the	   system	  functions,	   and	   the	   reason	   to	   create	   an	   own	   ETS	   market	   apart	   from	   the	   fixed	  installations	  market.	  	  3.	   Understand	   how	   the	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   system	   functions.	   How	   are	   the	   caps	  established,	  what	   is	   an	   allowance	   and	  how	  allowances	   are	  distributed	  over	   the	  airline	  operators.	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4.	  Analyse	  the	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  system,	  which	  are	  the	  principal	  variables	  involved	  in	  the	  system	  and	  how	  they	  behave	  under	  two	  different	  cases.	  	  5.	  Establish	  some	  basic	  guidelines	  about	  how	  to	  determine	  the	  ideal	  tax	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  extra	  emissions	  generated.	  	  	  	  
1.4	  Document	  structure	  	  	  The	   document	   is	   organized	   in	   three	   main	   sections	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   partial	  objectives	  proposed:	  
	  
Section	   2	   presents	   the	  Literature	   Review.	   It	   is	   initiated	  with	   an	   exposition	  of	   the	  three	   stages	   that	   conform	   the	  EU	  ETS,	   how	   are	   developed,	  why	   there	   is	   a	   separate	  emissions	  market	   for	   international	   aviation	   and	   how	   the	   cap	   for	   fixed	   installations	  functions.	   It	   continues	  with	   a	   comparison	   of	   the	  main	   differences	   between	   the	   two	  sectors.	  Which	  finally	  concludes	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  key	  design	  parameters	  that	  conform	  the	  EU	  ETS	   in	   international	  aviation	  (relevant	   information	  to	  properly	  understand	  the	  following	  section).	  	  
	  
Section	   3	   is	   divided	   in	   two	   parts,	   the	   first	   part	   where	   the	   cap	   and	   trade	   system	  





2.	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  	  	  	  The	  Emission	  Trading	   System	   for	   fixed	   installations	   is	   implemented	   in	   three	   stages	  [7,8]:	  	  
• Phase	  I	  (2005-­‐2007):	  	  	  Initial	   three-­‐year	   pilot	   phase	   focused	   on	   emissions	   from	   power	   generators	   and	  energy-­‐intensive	   industrial	   sectors.	   It	  was	   a	   ‘learning	   by	   doing’	   stage	  where	   it	  was	  possible	  to	  develop	  a	  strong	  basis	  to	  set	  the	  caps	  on	  national	  allocations	  plans	  for	  allowances.	  Almost	  all	  allowances	  were	  shared	  out	  to	  companies	  free	  of	  charge	  with	  a	  forty-­‐euro	  penalty	  per	  tonne	  due	  to	  non-­‐emission	  compliance.	  	  	  The	  phase	  ended	  with	  a	  success	   in	  establishing	  a	  price	  reference	  for	  carbon	  and	  for	  developing	   the	   necessary	   infrastructure	   tools	   to	   control	   and	   verify	   emissions	   from	  fixed	  installations.	  	  	  
• Phase	  II	  (2008-­‐2012):	  	  	  Experienced	   acquired	   on	   the	   previous	   step	   was	   crucial	   to	   detect	   new	   demands	  subsequently	  implemented.	  Allowances	  given	  away	  for	  free	  decreased	  in	  a	  ninety	  per	  cent	  while	  penalty	  per	   tonne	  rose	   to	  one	  hundred	  euro.	  The	  EU	  Commission	  reduced	   the	   total	   volume	   of	   emission	   allowances	   by	   6.5%	   reported	   from	   2005	  reference	  year.	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However	   companies	   were	   allowed	   to	   buy	   extra	   allowances	   from	   Kyoto	   Protocol’s	  Clean	  Development	  Mechanism	  and	  Joint	  Implementation.	  That	  fact	  let	  the	  EU	  ETS	  to	  become	  the	  most	  important	  international	  carbon	  market	  [3].	  	  	  
• Phase	  III	  (2013-­‐2020):	  	  	  Current	   development	   phase	   planned	   to	   run	   five	   more	   years.	   This	   stage	   includes	  several	  design	  adjustments	  starting	  with	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  single	  EU-­‐wide	  cap	  with	  an	   annual	   decrease	   of	   1.74%	  which	   leaves	   behind	   the	   national	   cap	   system	   and	   its	  national	   allocation	   plans.	   This	   harmonization	   will	   assure	   a	   significant	   decrease	   on	  greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   by	   2020.	   Auctioning	   is	   the	   default	   method	   where	   more	  than	  of	  40%	  allowances	  will	  be	  allocated.	  This	  percentage	  will	  be	  increased	  each	  year.	  	  More	  over	   implementation	  of	  a	   full	  auctioning	  for	  the	  power	  sector	  will	  conclude	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  phase	  with	  a	  30%	  free	  allocation	  decrease.	  	  	  
The	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  did	  not	  established	  any	  regulation	  to	  mitigate	  international	  
aviation’s	  emissions,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  Commission	  decided	  to	  regulate	  emissions	  
from	   international	   aviation	   separately	   from	   fixed	   installations,	   which	   are	  considered	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  targets	  [3,6].	  	  However	  the	  unilateral	  decision	  taken	  by	  the	  Commission	  on	  including	  international	  aviation	   in	   the	   EU	   ETS	   created	   big	   controversy.	   Many	   non-­‐European	   countries	   in	  disagreement,	  appealed	  the	  decision	  was	  not	  taken	  by	  the	  International	  Civil	  Aviation	  Organization	   (ICAO),	   causing	  an	   infringement	  of	   the	  Chicago	  Convention2	  and	  many	  other	  international	  conventions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Convention	  on	  international	  civil	  aviation	  held	  on	  December	  7,	  1994.	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The	  EU	  ETS	  for	  international	  aviation	  runs	  through	  two	   trading	  periods,	  2012	  and	  2013-­‐2020.	  In	  each	  period	  emissions	  are	  limited	  under	  a	  concrete	  level,	  i.e.	  the	  cap.	  	  Allowances	  are	  created	  corresponding	  to	  the	  cap	  which	  is	  established	  in	  accordance	  to	  a	  benchmark	  year	  [7,	  8].	  	  	  Every	   airline	   operator	   receives	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   free	   allowances	   to	   cover	   its	  emissions.	  Airline	  operators	  who	  need	  extra	  permits	  are	  allowed	   to	  buy	   them	   from	  EU	  auctions,	  carriers	  or	  other	  international	  emissions	  trading	  mechanism	  (Table	  1).	  	  Therefore,	   the	  EU	  ETS	  operates	   through	   a	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  mechanism	  based	  on	   the	  principal	  of	  creating	  tradable	  rights	  to	  emit	  that	  are	  distributed	  free	  of	  charge	  or	  
through	  auctioning.	  Permits	  under	  the	  name	  EUA	  (European	  Union	  Allowance)	  are	  allocated	  for	  fixed	  installations	  while	  EUAA	  (European	  Union	  Aviation	  Allowance)	  are	  for	  airline	  operators	  [8].	  	  	  	  
	  







Total	  Global	   EU	  
Table	   1:	   Representation	   of	   a	   comparison	   between	   CO2	   emissions	   generated	   in	   2006	   from	  
international	   aviation,	   domestic	   aviation,	   intra-­‐EU	   flights	   departing	   from	   EU	   and	   emissions	  








2.1	  The	  cap	  for	  Fixed	  Installations	  	  	  For	  the	  first	   two	  phases	  of	   the	  EU	  ETS	  for	   fixed	  installations	  (2005-­‐2007	  and	  2008-­‐2012)	   the	   cap	   was	   set	   under	   national	   levels	   through	   National	   Allocation	   Plans	  (NAPs).	  Accordingly,	  before	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  first	  and	  second	  phase,	  each	  Member	  State	  had	  to	  decide	  the	  number	  of	  allowances	  to	  allocate	  through	  the	  presentation	  of	  its	  NAPs	  to	  the	  Commission	  [9].	  	  Due	  to	  lack	  of	  reliable	  emissions	  data	  and	  experience,	  for	  the	  initial	  trading	  period	  the	   amount	   of	   allowances	   established	   was	   set	   through	   estimation,	   which	   caused	   a	  surplus	   on	   the	   quantity	   of	   permits,	   i.e.	   allowances	   exceeded	   demand.	   Most	   of	  allowances	   were	   freely	   distributed.	   Phase	   one	   was	   a	  pilot	   stage	   to	   obtain	   reliable	  emission	  data	  also	  to	  consolidate	  NAPs	  for	  the	  posterior	  phase.	  	  	  In	   phase	   two	   (2008-­‐2012),	   through	   knowledge	   acquired	   and	   verified	   emission	  reported	  in	  phase	  one,	  the	  Commission	  diminished	  the	  emissions	  allowance	  reducing	  the	   cap	   in	   a	  6.5%	  comparing	   to	  2005	   levels.	  However	   in	  2008,	   the	  economic	  crisis	  decreased	   in	   Europe	   the	   production	   from	   thousands	   of	   enterprises.	   Consequently	  demand	   for	   allowances	   diminished.	   Installations	   produced	   less,	   leading	   to	   a	   great	  reduction	  from	  emissions	  generated	  causing	  a	  surplus	  in	  the	  number	  of	  allowances.	  	  In	   the	   actual	   period	   (phase	   three;	   2013-­‐2020)	   an	   important	   reform	   has	   been	  implemented.	  NAPs	   are	   left	   behind	   leading	   the	   inclusion	  of	   a	  single	   cap	   for	   all	   the	  Member	  States.	  The	  most	   important	   feature	   is	   the	  1.74%	  reduction	  for	  each	  year	  of	  the	   average	   emissions	   issued	   by	   the	   Member	   States	   in	   the	   period	   2008-­‐2012	   (the	  number	   of	   allowances	   will	   be	   reduced	   annually	   by	   37.435.387).	   More	   than	   half	   of	  permits	   are	   distributed	   under	   auctioning.	   In	   order	   to	   achieve	   a	   40%	   reduction	   by	  2030	  compared	  to	  1990	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  levels,	  the	  cap	  will	  be	  lowered	  by	  2.2%	  each	  year	  from	  2021.	  	  	  The	  cap	  for	  international	  aviation	  will	  be	  reviewed	  on	  section	  3.	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2.2	  EU	  ETS	  Scheme	  Comparison	  	  	  To	  properly	  understand	  the	  overall	  function	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  is	  essential	  to	  present	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  systems	  through	  the	  key	  design	  elements	  that	  conform	  both	  schemes.	  	  	  	  The	  principal	  differences	  are	  summarized	  on	  Table	  2:	  	  	   	  	  	  	   FIXED	  INSTALLATIONS	  	   INTERNATIONAL	  AVIATION	  
Actual	  phase	   Phase	  III	   Phase	  III	  
Sectors	  covered	  
Energy	  and	  industrial	  installations,	  power	  and	  heat	  generators,	  domestic	  aviation	  
International	  Aviation	  from	  member	  states	  and	  third	  countries	  
Cap	  decreasing	   Annual	  decreasing	   Trading	  period	  decreasing	  
Type	  of	  emissions	  covered	   CO2,	  N2O,	  PFCs3	   CO2	  
Geographical	  scope	  	   28	  EU	  countries	  and	  the	  three	  EEA-­‐EFTA4	  states	  	   All	  flights	  into,	  out	  of	  and	  between	  the	  EEA5	  
Trading	  Entity	   European	  Commission	   European	  Commission	  through	  Member	  States	  
Allocation	  rules	  
Allowances	  defined	  at	  a	  EU	  level	  with	  a	  uniform	  allocation	  approach	   Allowances	  set	  at	  a	  Member	  State	  level	  	  
Interplay	  with	  the	  Kyoto	  
Protocol	  
Regulated	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	   Not	  subject	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  
Allowance	  distributing	  
mechanism	   Auctioning	   Free	  allocation	  and	  auctioning	  
Monitoring	  method	  
Monitoring	  and	  reporting	  annual	  emissions	  by	  fixed	  installation	  
Reporting	  annual	  emissions	  through	  estimated	  or	  actual	  fuel	  consumption	  by	  aircraft	  operator	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Carbon	  dioxide	  (CO2)	  from	  -­‐	  	  Power	  and	  heat	  generation	  -­‐	  Energy-­‐intensive	  industry	  sectors	  including	  oil	  refineries,	  steel	  works	  and	  production	  of	  iron,	  aluminium,	  metals,	  cement,	  lime,	  glass,	  ceramics,	  pulp,	  paper,	  cardboard,	  acids	  and	  bulk	  organic	  chemicals	  -­‐	  	  Commercial	  aviation	  Nitrous	  oxide	  (N2O)	  from	  production	  of	  nitric,	  adipic,	  glyoxal	  and	  glyoxlic	  acids	  Perfluorocarbons	  (PFCs)	  from	  aluminium	  production	  4	  Iceland,	  Liechtenstein	  and	  Norway	  5	  The	  twenty-­‐eight	  EU	  Member	  States,	  plus	  Iceland,	  Liechtenstein	  and	  Norway	  are	  included	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  Very	  light	  aircraft	  will	  not	  be	   covered.	  Military,	   police,	   customs	  and	   rescue	   flights,	   flights	   on	   state	   and	  government	  business,	   and	   training	  or	   testing	  flights	  will	  also	  be	  exempted	  
Table	  2:	  EU	  ETS	  markets	  comparison	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2.3	  EU	  ETS	  Framework	  	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  review	  each	  of	  the	  five	  ETS	  design	  parameters	  efficiently	  articulated	   to	   reduce	   the	   emissions	   level	   (geographical	   scope,	   trading	   entity,	  allocation	  rules,	  interplay	  with	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  allowance	  mechanism,	  monitoring	  method)	  commented	  on	  the	  previous	  figure.	  The	  detection	  of	  the	  principal	  elements	  has	   been	   made	   through	   the	   literature	   review	   from	   the	   document	   Giving	   wings	   to	  
emissions	  trading,	  (2005).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  system	  nowadays	  is	  developing	  under	  phase	  three	   and	   some	   elements	   from	   the	   EU	   ETS	   established	   in	   the	   initial	   phase	   have	  experimented	  modifications	  and	  adjustments	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  current	  stage	  [10].	  	  	  	  
2.3.1	  Geographical	  Scope	  	  As	  to	  date,	  three	  types	  of	  flights	  are	  included	  under	  the	  EU	  ETS	  [11]:	  	  
1-­‐ Flights	  between	  aerodromes	  in	  the	  EEA	  but	  not	  in	  outermost	  regions6.	  
With	   the	   exclusion	   of	   those	   flights	   with	   activity	   between	   aerodromes	   in	   an	  outermost	  region	  an	  aerodrome	  outside	  from	  the	  region.	  
2-­‐ Flights	  between	  aerodromes	  in	  the	  same	  outermost	  region.	  
With	   origin	   and	   destination	   in	   the	   nine	   outermost	   countries	   that	   belong	   to	  Portugal,	  Spain	  and	  France.	  
3-­‐ Flights	   between	   aerodromes	   in	   Croatia	   and	   aerodromes	   in	   the	   EEA.	  
Outermost	  regions	  are	  not	  included7.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  outermost	  regions	  are	  Canary	  Islands,	  French	  Guiana,	  Guadeloupe,	  Martinique,	  Mayotte,	  Réunion,	  Saint	  Martin,	  Azores,	  and	  Madeira.	  The	  territories	  Gibraltar,	  Aland	  Islands,	  Jan	  Mayen,	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  are	  considered	  member	  states	  of	  the	  EEA.	  7	  Since	  1	  January	  2014	  Croatia	  is	  fully	  integrated	  into	  the	  aviation	  part	  of	  EU	  ETS.	  Operators	  of	  flights	  within	  Croatia	  and	  between	  Croatia	  and	  non-­‐EEA	  countries	  need	  to	  surrender	  emission	  allowances	  only	  for	  flights	  carried	  out	  from	  1	  January	  2014	  onwards.	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Flights	  between	  aerodromes	   in	  Croatia	   and	   aerodromes	   located	   elsewhere	   in	  the	   EEA	   omitting	   those	   in	   outermost	   regions	   are	   fully	   covered	   under	   the	   EU	  ETS.	  	  
	  There	   is	   still	   a	   lot	   of	   controversy	   in	   how	   intercontinental	   emissions	   from	   flights	  departing	   from	   third	   countries	   outside	   the	   EU	   must	   be	   regulated.	   Nowadays	   the	  Commission	   [12]	   concludes	   that	   from	   2014	   to	   2020,	   flights	   to	   and	   from	   countries	  outside	  the	  EEA	  only	   the	  emissions	   from	  the	  proportion	  of	   the	   flight	   that	   takes	  
place	  within	   the	  EEA	  airspace	  would	  be	   covered.	  Emissions	  taking	  place	  outside	  the	   EEA	   airspace	   will	   be	   exempted.	   Also,	   flights	   between	   the	   EEA	   to	   or	   from	  developing	  countries,	  which	  emit	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  global	  aviation	  emissions,	  are	  fully	  exempted.	  
	  
2.3.2	  Trading	  Entity	  and	  the	  carbon	  markets	  	  The	  European	  Commission	  is	  in	  charge	  to	  assign	  a	  concrete	  quantity	  of	  allowances	  to	  each	  Member	   State.	   Therefore	   there	   are	   no	   national	   allocation	   plans	   as	   in	   the	   past	  was	   established	   for	   fixed	   installations.	   Member	   States	   will	   be	   only	   responsible	   for	  surrendering	  the	  amount	  of	  rights	  planned	  by	  the	  Commission	  [13].	  	  The	   trading	   entity	   is	   the	   airline	   operator	   who	   needs	   to	   surrender	   allowances	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  emissions	  generated.	  An	  airline	  operator	  is	  referred	  as	  the	  natural	  or	  
legal	  person	   that	  operates	   an	  aircraft	  at	   the	   time	   it	  performs	  an	  activity	   specified	   in	  
Annex	  I	  to	  the	  EU	  ETS	  Directive	  [12].	  Airline	   operators	  with	   low	   levels	   of	  GHG,	   once	   they	  have	   covered	   its	   emissions	   are	  allowed	  to	  trade	  with	  their	  extra	  permits,	  selling	  to	  other	  airline	  operators	  or	  saving	  them	  for	  future	  consumption.	  	  
 
 The	   carbon	   markets	   are	   economic	   systems	   where	   enterprises,	   governments,	  individuals	   or	   other	   institutions	   trade	   with	   allowances	   from	   greenhouse	   gas	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emissions.	  Nowadays	  exist	  two	  types	  of	  carbon	  markets,	  the	  regulatory	  compliance	  market	  and	  the	  voluntary	  market.	  	  The	  regulatory	  market	  is	  set	  up	  for	  companies	  due	  to	  governmental	  restrictions	  must	  report	  its	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.	  On	  the	  voluntary	  market,	  transactions	  between	  carbon	  emissions	  are	  set	  on	  a	  volunteer	  basis	  and	  function	  apart	  from	  the	  regulatory	  market.	  	  	  Clean	   Development	   Mechanism	   (CDM),	   Joint	   Implementation	   (JI)	   and	   Emissions	  Trading	   (ET)	   are	   the	   three	   flexible	   mechanisms	   (Fig.	   2)	   created	   to	   meet	   with	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  targets	  [11].	  	  
Clean	  Development	  Mechanism	  The	  CDM	  lets	  Annex	  I	  countries	  from	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	  to	  complete	  with	  its	  Kyoto	  Protocol’s	  objectives	  by	  funding	  greenhouse	  gas	  emission	  reduction	  projects	  from	  developing	  countries.	  CDM	  projects	  generate	  tradable	  emissions	  credits	  named	  Certified	  Emission	  Reduction8	  (CERs).	  	  
Joint	  Implementation	  JI	  functions	  in	  a	  very	  similar	  way	  to	  CDM.	  The	  main	  difference	  is	  that	  JI	  countries	  can	  only	   finance	   emission	   reduction	  projects	   from	  non-­‐development	   countries	   included	  in	   the	   Annex	   I	   from	   the	   UNFCCC.	   JI	   tradable	   emission	   credits	   are	   the	   Emission	  Reduction	  Unit9	  (ERUs).	  
	  
Emissions	  Trading	  Emissions	  Trading	   include	  countries	   from	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  Annex	   I.	  The	   tradable	  credits	  are	  Assigned	  Amount	  Unit	  (AAUs).	  	  	  The	   three	  mechanisms	   belong	   to	   the	   regulatory	  market	   including	   also	   the	   EU	   ETS.	  Installations	   under	   the	   EU	   ETS	  who	   need	   extra	   permits	   to	   cover	   its	   emissions	   are	  allowed	  to	  buy	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  allowances	  from	  CDM	  and	  JI	  programs.	  Therefore	  fixed	   installations	   can	   only	   buy	   additional	   permits	   from	   markets	   under	   the	   Kyoto	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  One	  CER	  equals	  to	  one	  metric	  tonne	  of	  CO2	  9	  One	  EUR	  equals	  to	  one	  metric	  tonne	  of	  CO2	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Protocol	   scope,	   fact	   that	   does	   not	   include	   the	   EU	   ETS	   market	   for	   international	  aviation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
















Figure	  2:	  Carbon	  markets	  representation	  
CERs	   ERUs	   AAUs	  
VERs	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2.3.3	  Interplay	  with	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  	  	  The	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   does	   not	   regulate	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   from	   fuel	  consumption	  caused	  by	   international	  aviation’s	  activity.	  Furthermore	   in	   this	   field	   is	  not	   included	   domestic	   aviation10,	   which	   its	   emissions	   are	   fully	   covered	   under	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  [2].	  	  	  The	  difference	  between	  domestic	  an	  international	  is	  that	  domestic	  flights	  take	  off	  and	  land	   in	   the	   same	   country	   making	   possible	   to	   assign	   the	   emissions	   generated	   to	   a	  certain	   state.	   On	   the	   contrary	   the	   main	   problem	   for	   international	   aviation	   is	   the	  difficulty	  to	  attribute	  CO2	  emissions	  given	  that	  a	  single	  flight	  operates	  along	  more	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Domestic	  aviation	  is	  the	  term	  related	  to	  flights	  that	  take	  place	  between	  to	  airports	  in	  the	  same	  country	  independently	  of	  the	  carrier’s	  nationality	  or	  the	  following	  destination	  of	  the	  aircraft.	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2012	   212.892.052	   182.561.019	   0.6797	   32.216.651	   0	  
Each	  year	  
(2013-­‐2020)	   208.502.525	   172.486.396	   0.6422	   31.552.390	   50.483.824	  	  	  The	   total	   distribution	   of	   allowances	   corresponding	   to	   each	   Member	   State	   is	  complemented	  by	  the	  individualized	  allocation	  of	  those	  permits	  to	  airline	  operators.	  The	  procedure	  used	  to	  distribute	  allowances	  over	  airline	  operators	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  section	  2.3.5.	  	  	  The	  Commission	  establishes	  three	  mechanism	  of	  allowances	  distribution	  [7,	  14]:	  	   -­‐ Free	  Allocation	  Free	  of	  charge	  allocation	  is	  the	  general	  method	  used	  through	  a	  benchmarking	  period	  to	   allocate	   allowances	  without	   any	   financial	   burden	   and	   to	   guarantee	   an	   equal	   and	  harmonized	  system	  across	  all	  the	  Member	  States	  (Table	  3).	  The	  amount	  of	  allowances	  distributed	   to	   each	  airline	  operator	   is	  determined	   through	   the	   implementation	  of	   a	  ratio:	  




EU	  wide	  cap	  	  	  x	  	  	  Where:	  	  
EU	  wide	  cap:	  the	  average	  of	  emissions	  from	  aviation	  from	  2004-­‐2006	  
Benchmark	  period:	  referred	  to	  2010	  calendar	  year	  Example:	  	  	  	  Total	  EU	  wide	  cap	   100	  Total	  TKM	  per	  aircraft	  operator	   600	  Total	  TKM	  per	  the	  total	  of	  aircraft	  operators	  	   10.000	  
	  
	  
Number	  of	  allowances	  allocated	  for	  aircraft	  operator	  
	  
𝟏𝟎𝟎  × 𝟔𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 =	  6	  
	  	   	  	  	  	  The	  ratio	  represents	   two	  critical	  problems	  that	  can	  rely	  on	  a	  disadvantage	  between	  airline	   operators.	   Airline	   operators	   have	   an	   important	   incentive	   to	   increase	   their	  market	  share	  and	  tonne-­‐kilometres	  during	  the	  benchmark	  period	  to	  obtain	  a	  higher	  amount	   of	   allowances.	   Also,	   non-­‐energy	   efficient	   operators	  might	   be	   in	   a	   favoured	  position.	  This	  mechanism	  of	  distribution	  should	  be	  revised	  in	  order	  to	  favour	  energy	  efficient	  operators	  (Table	  4).	  	   -­‐ Auctioning	  Auctioning	   is	   the	   method	   that	   the	   Member	   States	   distribute	   allowances	   to	   airline	  operators	  with	  a	  financial	  cost.	  This	  means	  that	  operators	  have	  to	  buy	  an	  increasing	  proportion	  of	  allowances	  through	  auctions.	  	  Revenues	   generated	   from	   the	   auctioning	   of	   allowances,	   should	   be	   used	   to	   reduce	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  and	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  third	  countries.	  Those	  revenues	  should	  also	  be	  used	  as	  financial	  supply	  for	  research	  and	  development	  projects.	  Auction	  revenues	  must	  be	  used	  to	  fund	  measures	  to	  avoid	  deforestation	  and	  facilitate	  adaptation	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  
TKM	  flown	  by	  the	  aircraft	  in	  the	  benchmark	  period	  
TKM	  flown	  by	  all	  the	  aircraft	  in	  the	  benchmark	  period	  
	  
Table	  4:	  EU	  ETS	  free	  allocation	  example	  [14]	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-­‐ New	  Entrants	  	  Special	   allowance	   is	   the	   reserve	   implemented	   in	   the	   second	  phase	  of	   the	  emissions	  trading	   scheme	   for	   aviation.	   The	  particular	   reserve	   is	   intended	   to	   airline	   operators	  such	  as	  new	  entrants.	  Also	  for	  airline	  operators	  that	  recently	  started	  their	  activity	  or	  those	   already	   in	   the	   system	   whose	   activity	   has	   increased	   significantly 11 .	   The	  remaining	  quantity	  in	  the	  special	  reserve	  will	  be	  used	  for	  auctioning.	  	  	  EUAAs	  are	  the	  carbon	  allowances	  that	  aircraft	  operators	  use	  as	  certificates	  to	  cover	  its	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions.	   EU	  ETS	   in	   aviation	  works	   as	   an	   open	   cape-­‐and-­‐trade	  scheme,	  which	  means	  that	  operators	  can	  buy	  extra	  EUAAs	  on	  the	  carbon	  market	  from	  other	  operators.	  As	  agreed	  under	  the	  European	  Commission	  [4]	  it	  is	  also	  accepted	  to	  buy	  extra	  allowances	  as	  ERUs	  and	  CERs	  from	  the	  Clean	  Development	  Mechanism	  and	  the	   Joint	   Implementation	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol12	  commented	   on	   the	   section	   2.3.2.	  Airlines	   are	   permitted	   to	   use	   ERUs	   or	   CERs	   with	   a	   restricted	   use	   of	   1.5%	   to	   the	  subsequent	  period.	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   side	   and	   to	   ensure	   the	   correct	   function	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	   airline	  operators	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  sell	  EUAs	  to	  other	  sectors.	  This	  measure	  is	  imposed	  due	  international	  aviation	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  targets	  [2,4].	  	  	  At	   the	   end	   of	   a	   trading	   period	   airline	   operators	   are	   obliged	   to	   compute	   an	   equal	  number	  of	  EUAs	  to	  their	  CO2	  emissions	  from	  the	  years	  proceeded.	  In	  the	  case	  that	  the	  quantity	   of	   EUAs	   acquired	   do	   not	   cover	   the	   emissions	   a	   penalty	   at	   a	   rate	   of	   one	  hundred	   euros	  per	   exceeding	   tonne	  of	   CO2	  is	   charged.	  During	   the	   consecutive	   year,	  the	   airline	   will	   be	   obligated	   to	   compensate	   the	   shortfall	   by	   reducing	   its	   emissions	  properly.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Aircraft	  operators	  whose	  full-­‐scope	  TKM	  data	  increase	  by	  an	  average	  of	  more	  than	  18%	  annually	  between	  the	  monitoring	  year	  for	  which	  TKM	  data	  was	  summited	  and	  the	  second	  calendar	  year	  of	  that	  period	  can	  apply	  for	  allocation	  from	  the	  special	  reserve.	  	  12	  One	  CER	  represents	  the	  reduction	  of	  one	  metric	  ton	  of	  CO2	  (carbon	  dioxide	  or	  its	  equivalent	  in	  other	  greenhouse	  gases).	  These	  credits	  are	  generated	  under	  the	  Clean	  Development	  mechanism	  of	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  One	  ERU	  is	  a	  tradable	  certificate	  that	  represents	  one	  tonne	  of	  CO2.	  These	  credits	  are	  generated	  under	  the	  Joint	  Implementation	  mechanism	  of	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	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2.3.5	  Monitoring	  and	  Reporting	  Methods	  	  	  Rules	   for	  monitoring	  and	  reporting	  CO2	  emissions	   from	  airline	  operators	  have	  been	  settled	  under	  the	  M&R	  EU	  Regulation	  [15,16]	  directly	  applicable	  in	  all	  Member	  States	  and	  from	  the	  emissions	  of	  the	  second	  trading	  period	  starting	  in	  201313.	  	  At	   the	   beginning	   of	   every	   year,	   the	   European	   Commission	   publishes	   a	   list	   of	   each	  airline	  operator	  identified	  by	  Eurocontrol	  is	  assigned	  to	  a	  Member	  State	  whose	  flights	  will	   take	   place	   under	   the	   geographical	   framework	   of	   the	   EU	   ETS.	   Each	   airline	  operator	  for	  administrative	  simplicity	  reasons	  will	  be	  assigned	  to	  one	  administering	  participating	  country	  that	  will	  take	  charge	  of	  the	  airline	  operator.	  	  Firstly	   airline	  operators	  will	   have	   to	   submit	   to	   the	  Competent	  Authority	   (CA)	  of	   its	  Member	  State	  responsible	  the	  templates	  containing	  the	  monitoring	  plans	  for	  annual	  emissions	  and	  tonne-­‐kilometre.	  Those	  templates	  explain	  how	  they	  will	  report	  the	  fuel	  consumption	  (Monitoring	  Plan	  report)	  and	  the	  tonne-­‐kilometre	  data	  (TKM	  report).	  	  Once	   the	   CA	   has	   approved	   the	   templates,	   the	   airline	   operator	   is	   allowed	   to	   start	  reporting	  its	  TKM	  from	  the	  benchmark	  year	  [4].	  	  	  	  
• TONNE-­‐KILOMETRE	  REPORT	  	  	  Airline	   operators	   must	   submit	   a	   tonne-­‐kilometre	   report	   when	   apply	   for	   free	  
allocation	   of	   allowances,	   i.e.	   TKM	   report	   is	   the	   document	   required	   to	   apply	   for	  allowances	  without	  financial	  burden.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  if	  an	  operator	  does	  not	  present	  the	  subject	  information	  will	  not	  take	  part	  on	  the	  free	  allowance	  process.	  The	  application	  must	  be	  made	  subject	  to	  the	  TKM	  transported	  by	  the	  airline	  from	  the	  flights	  of	   the	  monitoring	  year	  established	  (benchmark	  year	  2010	  for	  the	  first	  two	  trading	  periods).	  To	   distribute	   free	   allowances	   the	   European	   Commission	   establishes	   a	   ratio	   that	  divides	   the	   total	   allowances	   to	  be	  allocated	   free	  of	   charge	  between	   the	   total	   tonne-­‐kilometres	   transported	   in	   2010	   from	   all	   operators	   who	   submitted	   the	   application.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Emissions	  before	  2013	  where	  regulated	  under	  the	  MRG	  Guidance,	  (2007).	  
20	  	  
Each	   operator	   will	   receive	   a	   number	   of	   allowances	   equal	   to	   the	   TKM	   transported	  from	  2010	  (benchmark	  year)	  and	  multiplied	  by	  the	  ratio.	  For	  that	  reason	  TKM	  report	  is	  the	  most	  important	  document	  for	  an	  airline	  [16].	  	  	  The	  report	  must	  content	  detailed	  information	  specified	  above	  through	  the	  following	  calculations:	  	  	  	  	  	  Where:	  	  
Distance	  =	  great	  circle	  distance	  [km]	  +	  95	  [km]	  Distance	  equals	  to	  the	  great	  circle	  distance14	  between	  the	  origin	  and	  the	  destination	  adding	  and	  additional	  fixed	  factor.	  	  
	  
Total	  mass	  of	  freight	  =	  mass	  of	  freight	  [t]	  +mass	  of	  mail	  [t]+	  mass	  of	  passengers	  and	  
checked	  baggage	  [t]	  Total	  mass	  of	  freight	  is	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  cargo,	  mail	  and	  passengers	  carried.	  	  	  The	  mass	  of	  passengers	  and	  checked	  baggage	  can	  be	  calculated	  throw	  two	  methods:	  -­‐ Default	  value	  of	  100	  kg	  for	  each	  passenger	  and	  his	  checked	  baggage.	  -­‐ Concrete	  value	  with	  the	  actual	  or	  standard	  passenger	  and	  baggage	  weight	  reflected	  in	  the	  mass	  and	  balance	  documentation.	  	  It	  also	  must	  be	  reported:	  	  	  -­‐	  Changes	  and	  deviations	  from	  the	  approved	  monitoring	  plan.	  -­‐	   Registration	   of	   airline	   and	   types	   of	   airline	   used	   by	   the	   operator	   subject	   to	   the	  system.	  -­‐	   Chosen	   for	   calculating	   the	  weight	   of	   passengers	   and	   checked	   baggage	  method	   as	  well	  as	  for	  cargo	  and	  mail.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  GCD	  equals	  to	  the	  shortest	  distance	  between	  two	  spots	  located	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  a	  sphere.	  	  
Total	  tonne–kilometres	  =	  distance	  [km]	  x	  total	  mass	  of	  freight	  [t]	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-­‐	   Total	   passenger-­‐km	   and	   tonne-­‐kilometres	   for	   all	   flights	   subject	   to	   the	   scheme,	  carried	  out	  during	  the	  year.	  -­‐	  For	  each	  aerodrome	  pair:	  
• The	  ICAO	  designator	  for	  two	  airports	  
• Distance	  (GCD	  +	  95	  fixed	  factor)	  
• Total	  number	  of	  flights	  
• Total	  weight	  of	  passengers	  and	  checked	  baggage	  	  
• Total	  number	  of	  passengers	  
• Total	  number	  of	  passenger-­‐km	  
• Total	  weight	  of	  freight	  and	  mail	  	  
• Total	  number	  of	  tonne-­‐km	  	  The	  CA	  is	  in	  charge	  to	  verify	  every	  report	  prior	  to	  referral	  to	  the	  competent	  authority.	  	  	  	  	  
• MONITORING	  PLAN	  REPORT	  	  The	  Monitoring	  Plan	  specifies	  how	  tonne-­‐kilometre	  emissions	  from	  airline	  operators	  generated	  during	  one	  year	  will	  be	  reported	   [16].	  Monitoring	  plans	  are	  presented	   in	  paper	   and	  digital	   format	  with	   the	   inclusion	  of	   additional	   documentation	   requested.	  TKM	   monitoring	   plans	   should	   be	   introduced	   at	   least	   four	   months	   before	   the	  beginning	  of	  a	  trading	  period.	  In	  each	  case	  the	  competent	  authority	  must	  approve	  the	  plan.	  The	  monitoring	  plan	  must	  include:	  	   -­‐	  A	  completed	   list	  of	   the	  airline’s	   fleet,	   the	  number	  of	  airline	  per	   type	  and	  the	   fuel	  consumption	  method	  of	  calculation	  for	  each	  airline.	  	  -­‐	  An	  indicative	   list	  of	   the	  types	  and	  number	  of	  airline	  that	  are	  expected	  to	   join	  the	  fleet.	  -­‐	  A	  description	  of	  procedures,	   systems	  and	   responsibilities	  used	   to	  update	   the	   list	  during	  the	  monitoring	  year.	  -­‐	  A	  description	  of	  the	  procedures	  used	  to	  control	  the	  list	  of	  operated	  flights	  as	  well	  as	  procedures	  to	  ensure	  which	  flights	  are	  included	  and	  which	  are	  exempt.	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-­‐	   A	   description	   of	   the	   activities	   and	   management	   of	   data	   acquisition	   and	   control	  activities	  and	  quality	  assurance,	  including	  maintenance	  and	  calibration	  of	  measuring	  equipment.	  -­‐	  A	  description	  of	  the	  methods	  used	  for	  monitoring	  (and	  transmission,	  storage	  and	  retrieval)	  of	  fuel	  consumption	  data,	  including:	  
  The	  methodology	  chosen	  to	  calculate	  the	  fuel	  consumption.	  
  The	  procedures	  for	  measuring	  the	  fuel	  supply	  and	  fuel	  tanks.	  
  The	   procedure	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   total	   uncertainty	   of	   fuel	  measurements	  meet	  the	  requirements	  for	  monitoring	  and	  reporting.	  
  The	   procedure	   for	   measuring	   the	   density	   of	   the	   fuel	   and	   emission	  factors	  used	  for	  each	  type	  of	  fuel	  used.	  	  	  	  
• MONITORING	  PLAN	  THROUGHOUT	  THE	  YEAR	  	  	  Once	  the	  calendar	  year	  has	  started	  each	  airline	  operator	  must	  pay	  for	  the	  emissions	  generated	   over	   the	   previous	   year	   through	   the	   delivery	   of	   a	   certain	   number	   the	  allowances	  [16].	  To	  be	  able	   to	  determine	  how	  many	  allowances	  must	  be	  delivered,	  airline	  operators	  need	  to	  monitor	  the	  CO2	  emissions	  per	  flight	  generated	  in	  the	  geographical	  scope	  that	  covers	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  	  	  The	   quantity	   of	   emissions	   determined	   in	   the	   monitoring	   plan	   will	   be	   the	   official	  amount	  to	  measure	  if	  the	  airline	  has	  exceeded	  the	  permissible	  capacity.	  	  	  	  
For	  each	  flight	  emissions	  are	  calculated	  through	  the	  following	  method:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Em	  =	  AD	  x	  EF	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Where:	  
Em:	  total	  amount	  of	  CO2	  [t]	  
AD:	  amount	  of	  fuel	  consumed	  [t]	  




	  	  	  	  	  Where:	  	  	  
FY,	  A:	  Total	  fuel	  consumed	  for	  the	  flight	  Y	  under	  consideration	  using	  method	  A	  [t]	  
TY:	  Quantity	  of	  fuel	  contained	  in	  aircraft	  tanks	  once	  fuel	  uplift	  for	  the	  flight	  Y	  under	  consideration	  is	  complete	  [t]	  
TY+1:	   Amount	   of	   fuel	   contained	   in	   aircraft	   tanks	   once	   fuel	   uplift	   for	   the	  subsequent	  flight	  Y+1	  is	  complete	  [t]	  
UY+1:	  Fuel	  uplift	  for	  the	  subsequent	  flight	  Y+1	  [t]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Airplane	  device	  used	  primarily	  during	  aircraft	  ground	  operation	  that	  provides	  electric	  power.	  An	  APU	  can	  also	  provide	  backup	  electric	  power	  during	  in-­‐flight	  operations.	  	  16	  Section	  1	  of	  Annex	  III	  of	  the	  M&R	  Regulation:	  “Actual	  fuel	  consumption	  for	  each	  flight	  [t]	  =	  Amount	  of	  fuel	  contained	  in	  aircraft	  
tanks	  once	  fuel	  uplift	  for	  the	  flight	  is	  complete	  [t]	  –	  Amount	  of	  fuel	  contained	  in	  aircraft	  tanks	  once	  fuel	  uplift	  for	  subsequent	  flight	  is	  
complete	  [t]	  +	  Fuel	  uplift	  for	  that	  subsequent	  flight	  [t]”	  [6].	  
FY,	  A	  =	  TY	  –	  TY+1+UY+1	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Particular	  situations	  to	  be	  contemplated:	  	  1)	  If	  at	  any	  case	  there	  is	  no	  fuel	  uplift	  for	  the	  flight	  or	  subsequent	  flight	  scheduled,	  the	  fuel	  resting	  in	  the	  tanks	  will	  be	  the	  corresponded	  when	  the	  flight	  Y	  and	  Y+1	  takes	  off.	  	  	  2)	  Due	  to	  technical	  maintenance	  reasons	  where	  the	  fuel	  tanks	  must	  be	  emptied	  and	  in	  exceptional	   cases	   where	   the	   variable	   TN+1	  cannot	   be	   specified,	   fuel	   concerning	   the	  following	  flight	  Y+1	  will	  correspond	  to	  the	  fuel	  tanks	  of	  the	  following	  aircraft	  activity.	  	  	  	  	  	  
METHOD	  B17	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Where:	  	  	  
FY,	  B:	  Total	  fuel	  consumed	  for	  the	  flight	  Y	  under	  consideration	  using	  method	  B	  [t]	  
RY-­‐1:	  Quantity	  of	  fuel	  remaining	  in	  the	  aircraft	  tanks	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  previous	  flight	  Y-­‐1	  [t]	  
RY:	  Quantity	  of	   fuel	   remaining	   in	   the	   aircraft	   tanks	   at	   the	   end	  of	   the	   flight	  Y	  under	  consideration	  [t]	  
UY:	  Fuel	  uplift	  for	  the	  flight	  Y	  under	  consideration	  [t]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Section	  1	  of	  Annex	  III	  of	  the	  M&R	  Regulation:	  “Actual	  fuel	  consumption	  for	  each	  flight	  [t]	  =	  Amount	  of	  fuel	  remaining	  in	  aircraft	  
tanks	  at	  block-­‐on	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  previous	  flight	  [t]	  +	  Fuel	  uplift	  for	  the	  flight	  [t]	  -­‐	  Amount	  of	  fuel	  contained	  in	  tanks	  at	  block-­‐on	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  flight	  [t]”	  [6].	  	  
FY,	  B	  =	  RY-­‐1	  –	  RY	  +	  UY	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Particular	  situations	  to	  be	  contemplated:	  	  	  In	  the	  event	  that	  that	  an	  aircraft	  does	  not	  perform	  a	  flight	  previous	  to	  the	  flight	  under	  consideration,	  the	  variable	  RY-­‐1	  will	  be	  substitute	  with	  the	  amount	  of	  fuel	  remaining	  in	  aircraft	  tanks	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  previous	  activity	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  	  	  
DENSITY	  	  To	   correctly	   count	   emissions	   using	   Method	   A	   or	   B,	   the	   amount	   of	   fuel	   uplift	   or	  remaining	  in	  the	  tanks	  must	  be	  determined	  under	  the	  same	  units	  of	  volume18.	  As	  for	  that	   reason	   mass	   values	   must	   be	   converted	   to	   actual	   density	   values	   using	   the	  following	   formula	   [16].	   In	   addition	   in	   the	   case	   that	   fuel	   is	   determined	   in	   units	   of	  volume	  (litres	  or	  m3),	  the	  operator	  must	  convert	  it	  to	  weight	  (kg)	  using	  actual	  density	  values.	  The	  following	  formula	  determines:	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  Where:	  
M:	  Mass	  of	  fuel	  [t]	  
V:	  Volume	  of	  fuel	  [L]	  
ρ:	  Actual	  fuel	  density	  determined	  for	  the	  applicable	  temperature	  [kg/L]	  
ƒ:	  Correction	  factor	  for	  making	  units	  consistent.	  When	  ρ	   is	  expressed	  as	  kg/L	  then	  ƒ	  adopts	  a	  value	  of	  1t/1000kg.	  	  
	  Only	  in	  the	  case	  where	  there	  is	  no	  density	  data	  ρ	  available	  a	  standard	  density	  factor	  of	  0.8kg/L	  will	  be	  applied	  (with	  the	  prior	  approval	  of	  the	  CA).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Litres,	  US	  gallons	  or	  m3	  





3.	  CAP-­‐AND-­‐TRADE	  SYSTEM	  	  	  
3.1	  Background:	  EU	  ETS	  Structure	  
	  Current	  operating	  mechanism	  developed	  in	  two	  trading	  periods:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  
BASELINE	  YEAR	  HISTORICAL	  EMISSIONS	  (2004-­‐2005-­‐2006)	  	  
-­‐3%	  
87%	   15%	  
-­‐5%	  









Figure	  3:	  EU	  ETS	  Cap-­‐and-­‐Trade	  System	  
	  	  Baseline	  
	  	  	  2012	  	  
2013-­‐2020	  	  
	  	  Baseline	  
100%	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The	   EU	   ETS	   currently	   caps	   the	   number	   of	   emissions	   from	   international	   aviation	  through	   a	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   system	   for	   the	   first	   (2012)	   and	   second	   trading	   period	  (2013-­‐2020).	  	  	  The	  system	  is	  organized	  under	  two	  caps	  related	  to	  the	  corresponding	  trading	  period	  (Fig.	   3).	   The	   caps	   are	   set	   under	   a	   reference	   baseline	   year,	   which	   is	   calculated	  through	  the	  average	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  generated	  by	  international	  aviation	  between	  the	  years	  2004,	  2005	  and	  2006	  [6].	  	  	  	  For	   the	   first	   trading	   period	   the	   baseline	   year	   quantity	   has	   been	   reduced	   a	   3%	  compared	   to	   the	  baseline	  period.	  Meaning	   that	   the	   cap	  will	   be	   equal	   to	  97%	  of	   the	  historical	   emissions	   (baseline	   period).	   The	   amount	   of	   allowances	   is	   distributed	  between	  the	  airline	  operators	  for	  free	  (87%)	  and	  under	  auctioning	  (15%)	  	  The	  same	  procedure	  is	  followed	  for	  the	  second	  trading	  period.	  The	  cap	  is	  targeted	  to	  be	  reduced	  a	  5%	  from	  the	  baseline	  year,	  which	  means	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  allowances	  is	  diminished.	  The	  quantity	  of	  allowances	  allocated	  under	  the	  cap	  is	  assigned	  for	  free	  (82%),	  under	  auctioning	  (15%)	  and	  to	  new	  entrants	  (3%).	  	  	  
	  
3.2	  Analysis	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  	  	  Before	  2012,	  airline	  operators	  were	  allowed	  to	  emit	  as	  much	  as	  they	  needed	  with	  a	  zero	   price	   penalty	   and	   under	   no	   regulation.	   Once	   the	   EU	   ETS	   started	   to	   operate	  (2012),	  the	  Commission,	  taking	  the	  role	  as	  a	  Regulator,	  established	  a	  frontier	  (i.e.	  the	  cap)	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   limiting	   the	   number	   of	   emissions.	   Despite	   that	   fact,	   airline	  operators	  were	  still	  allowed	  to	  emit	  under	  the	  same	  levels	  from	  before	  2012.	  But	  on	  the	  contrast	  when	  an	  airline	  operator	  exceeds	  its	  corresponding	  share	  of	  the	  frontier	  (i.e.	   its	   number	   of	   allowances	   does	   not	   cover	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   emissions	  generated)	  an	  economic	  penalty	  is	  imposed.	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Therefore,	   as	   far	   as	   it	   can	   be	   understood	   from	   the	   European	   Commission	  documentation,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  EU	  Commission	  wants	  to	  fix	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  current	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  system	  (Fig.	  3),	  which	  means	  the	  system	  will	  not	  be	  adapted	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  exponential	  aviation	  demand	  increase,	  expected	  over	  the	  future	  years.	  Thus,	  airline	  operators	   shall	  be	  allowed	   to	  emit	   “for	   free”	  under	   the	   same	   levels	   than	   the	  past	   years	   (receiving	   a	   great	   amount	   of	   allowances	   free	   of	   charge)	   but	   the	   frontier	  established	  will	  not	  be	  augmented	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  increasing	  demand.	  	  	  As	   a	   result,	  when	   an	   airline	   operator	  may	   generate	   extra	   emissions	   that	   cannot	   be	  covered	   with	   allowances	   (emissions	   outside	   the	   frontier)	   must	   pay	   a	   penalty	   to	  
internalise	  the	  environmental	  externality	  caused	  [7].	  What	   is	   important	   to	  notice	  
is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  penalty	  imposed	  to	  emit	  outside	  the	  cap	  is	  equivalent	  to	  put	  a	  
price	   to	   the	   emissions,	   thus	   implicitly	   allowing	   the	   operators	   to	   emit	   beyond	  
the	  fixed	  cap.	  This	  means	  that	  such	  price/tax	  for	  extra	  emissions	  and	  its	  impact	  
on	   the	   entire	   system	  must	   be	   careful	   analysed.	  What	   is	  more	  remarkable	   is	   the	  probably	   fact,	   that	   if	   the	   penalty	   is	   low	   enough	   in	   comparison	   with	   the	   benefits	  obtained	  by	  the	  airline	  operators	  to	  emit	  (i.e.	  operating	  more),	  those	  airline	  operators	  will	  be	  willing	   to	  pay	   the	   fine.	  Therefore,	  due	   to	   for	   the	  coming	  years	   is	  expected	  a	  high	   increase	  of	   the	  aviation	   transport	   it	   can	  be	  predicted	   that	   the	   real	   cap,	  will	  be	  bigger	   than	  the	  one	  established	  by	  the	  Regulator	  which	  corresponds	  to	   the	  demand	  from	  the	  baseline	  year.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  in	  Fig.	  4,	  before	  2012,	  airline	  operators	  were	  not	  subject	  to	  any	  restriction	  and	  could	  freely	  emit	  to	  responding	  the	  demand.	  After	  2012,	  once	  EU	  ETS	  
BEFORE	  2012	   AFTER	  2012	  
Figure	  4:	  The	  Cap	  before	  and	  after	  the	  EU	  ETS	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came	  into	  function,	  a	  cap	  was	  set	  over	  the	  emissions	  generated	  in	  2004-­‐2006,	  so	  the	  same	  level	  of	  emissions	  was	  kept.	  Also,	  airline	  operators	  received	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  allowances	   for	   free	   (probably	   due	   to	   grandfathering/retrospective	   arguments).	  However,	   when	   an	   operator	   cannot	   cover	   its	   emissions	   it	   can	   pay	   a	   fine	   to	   emit	  outside	  the	  cap.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  amount	  of	  extra	  allowances	  can	  generate	  a	  new	  cap,	  higher	  than	  the	  one	  fixed	  by	  the	  EU	  ETS	  Regulator,	  which	  probably	  would	  meet	  the	  airline	  operator	  demand.	  	  
	  
3.3	   EU	   ETS	   Emission	   Pricing:	   what	   is	   the	  
optimum	  price?	  	  As	  understood	  in	  the	  previous	  analysis,	   the	  penalties	  to	  extra	  tonne	  emission	  out	  of	  the	   free-­‐allocated	   endowment	   can	   be	   indeed	   interpreted	   as	   a	   price,	   such	   as	   a	  
pigouvian	  tax.	  It	  is	  understood	  by	  our	  side	  that	  there	  must	  be	  an	  optimal	  price	  for	  the	  extra	   emissions	   generated,	   since	   there	   is	   a	   trade-­‐off	   between	   being	   too	  
restrictive,	  i.e.	  fixing	  a	  price	  so	  high	  that	  the	  cap	  will	  be	  close	  to	  the	  one	  fixed	  by	  ETS,	  which	  may	  cause	  that	   the	   future	  air	   traffic	  demand	  could	  not	  be	  attended	  (with	   the	  huge	   economic	   costs	   for	   the	   European	   macroeconomy	   and	   competitiveness),	   and	  
being	   too	   lax,	   i.e.	   emissions	   for	   free,	   which	   may	   lead	   to	   a	   non-­‐sustainable	   air	  transportation	  system.	  	  	  To	   illustrate	   the	   concept,	   let	   state	   three	   hypothetical	   assumptions	   for	   a	   2030	  scenario:	  	   1) Demand	   from	   international	   aviation	   highly	   increases	   in	  comparison	  to	  2012.	  2) Emissions	  are	  regulated	  under	  a	  fixed	  cap	  subject	  to	  no	  demand	  adjustment.	  3) The	  penalty	  for	  exceeding	  the	  frontier	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  fixed	  price.	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Under	  these	  assumptions,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  observe	  two	  potential	  scenarios:	  	  	  
Case	   1-­‐	   If	   the	   fine	   charged	   for	   each	   extra	   tonne	   of	   CO2	  generated	   is	   100€	   and	   in	  operational	  terms	  it	  means	  a	  low	  rate,	  airline	  operators	  will	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  the	  fine	  therefore	  to	  emit	  outside	  the	  cap	  established.	  	  Airline	  operators	  will	  be	  able	  to	  emit	  as	  much	  as	  they	  require	  due	  to	  100€	  fine	  is	  an	  affordable	  cost	  to	  internalize.	  Therefore	  the	  100€	  rate	  will	  indirectly	  establish	  a	  new	  frontier	  due	  to	  the	  Regulator	  is	  putting	  a	  price	  on	  the	  carbon	  emission.	  	  	  
Case	   2-­‐	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   if	   the	   100€	   rate	   represents	   an	   unaffordable	   rate	   for	  airline	  operators	  (i.e.	  the	  Regulator	  is	  establishing	  a	  highly	  negative	  incentive	  to	  the	  airline	   operator),	   thus	  will	   oblige	   operators	   to	   not	   emit	   over	   the	   frontier.	   That	   fact	  will	   generate	   dissatisfaction	   and	   less	   welfare	   for	   the	   customers	   and	   for	   the	   entire	  European	  macroeconomy.	  Airline	  operators	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  cover	  all	  the	  demand.	  If	   so,	   it	   could	   be	   penalizing	   a	   lot	   to	   the	   traffic	   demand,	   with	   the	   consequent	  macroeconomic	   costs,	   unless	   that	   a	   big	   change	   in	   aircraft	   engines	   and	   energetic	  technologies	   is	  expected	  to	  happen	  over	  the	  next	   future	  years,	  where	  operators	  will	  have	  to	  adapt	  and	  incorporate	  this	  new	  technology	  in	  order	  to	  survive	  in	  the	  market.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  As	  we	  can	  see	   in	  Fig.	  5,	   the	  green	  curve	  represents	   the	   fixed	  cap	  established	  by	   the	  Regulator	   where	   airline	   operators	   receive	   allowances	   for	   free.	   The	   blue	   curve	  represents	  the	  baseline	  year.	  If	  the	  economic	  cost	  to	  move	  from	  the	  green	  frontier	  to	  









4.	  PRICING	  GUIDELINE	  	  	  
4.1	   Considerations	   on	   how	   to	   determine	   an	  
optimum	  price	  
	  Clean	  air	  is	  a	  scarce	  resource	  and	  that	  is	  why	  EU-­‐ETS	  aims	  at	  regulating	  the	  level	  of	  emissions.	  It	  is	  understood	  in	  this	  work	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  pollution	  that	   is	  not	  affordable	   for	  permitting	  the	   live	  with	  acceptable	  comfort.	  Therefore,	  we	  refer	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  real	   limit	  as	  the	  hard-­‐constraint	   cap,	  a	  cap	  limit	  that	  cannot	  be	  exceeded	  with	  emissions	  from	  airline	  operators	  (nor	  anyone	  else),	  because	  the	  health	  of	  live	  beings	  could	  be	  seriously	  injured.	  Surpass	  that	  limit	  would	  generate	  devastating	  effects	  for	  the	  environment	  and	  consequently	  will	  not	  be	  accepted	  for	  the	  society.	  	  In	  addition,	  and	  without	  loss	  of	  generality,	  we	  assume	  that	  no	  important	  technological	  changes	   will	   happen	   on	   the	   following	   years	   or	   decades	   that	   could	   substantially	  contribute	  to	  reduce	  the	  levels	  of	  emissions	  per	  flight,	  i.e.,	  same	  airplane	  models	  and	  flight	   efficiency	  will	   remain	   in	   the	   same	  order	   of	   nowadays	   (the	   expected	   emission	  reductions	  pointed	   in	   the	   future	  Air	  Traffic	  Management	   (ATM)	  are	  considered,	  but	  not	   affecting	   the	   discussion).	   Given	   the	   case	   where	   a	   revolutionary	   technological	  change	   happens,	   the	   following	   discussion	   should	   be	   reconsidered	   and	   even	   could	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become	  useless	   (e.g.,	   if	   a	   new	   type	   of	   clean	   engines	   is	   invented	   and	   aircraft	   do	  not	  pollute	   anymore,	   the	   model	   discussed	   will	   only	   remain	   interesting	   at	   theoretical	  level).	  	  The	  main	  argument	  proposed	  in	  this	  work	  is	  that	   there	   is	  a	   trade-­‐off	  between	  the	  
benefits	   of	   having	   clean	   air	   and	   the	   benefit	   of	   flying	   to	   transport	   people	   and	  
loads.	   However	   as	   soon	   as	   the	   level	   of	   emissions	   (E)	   approaches	   to	   the	   hard-­‐constraint	  cap	  (Fig.	  6),	  the	  price	   to	  pay	   for	   the	  emissions	  generated	  outside	   the	  
EU	   ETS	   cap	   (free	   emission	   rights)	   should	   increase,	   since	   the	   emissions	   are	  reaching	  a	  critical	  and	  dangerous	   level.	  Moreover	  the	  price	  to	  pay	  for	  exceeding	  the	  hard-­‐constraint	  cap	  would	  have	  to	  be	  boundless	  (i.e.,	  infinite).	  Thus,	  since	  the	  level	  of	  emissions	   depends	   on	   the	   level	   of	   traffic	   (under	   the	   consideration	   of	   same	  technological	   frame)	   the	   emission	   price	   must	   be	   variable	   (dynamic)	   and	   not	  
static,	  and	  relative	  to	  the	  proximity	  to	  the	  hard-­‐constraint	  cap	  level	  (which	  should	  be	  quantitatively	  accounted).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  But	   as	   close	   as	   the	   emissions	   from	  an	  airline	  operator	   get	   to	   the	   limit,	   the	   variable	  price	   should	   increase	   to	   generate	   higher	   incentives	   for	   the	   airline	   operators	   to	  reduce	  its	  level	  of	  emissions.	  The	  fact	  of	  paying	  a	  higher	  amount	  means	  that	  operators	  
E	   +	  €	  
E	   +	  +	  +	  €	  
E	   +	  +	  €	  
∞	  €	  
Hard-­‐Constraint	  cap	  
EU	  ETS	  cap	  
Figure	  6:	  Hard-­‐Constraint	  cap	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are	   emitting	   too	  much,	   evidence	   that	   affects	   negatively	   on	   the	   benefit	   of	   flying	   (i.e.	  demand	  reduction).	  	  Thus,	  through	  a	  price	  setting,	  the	  Regulator	  can	  force	  the	  operators	  to	  become	  more	  




Total	  Cost	   Air	  traffic	  loss	  Emissions	  increase	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Where	  would	  be	  the	  optimum	  price?	  The	  optimum	  price	  (p*	  in	  Fig.	  7)	  would	  be	  the	  point	  where	  the	  total	  cost	  endured	  by	  the	  society	  is	  minimum.	  See	  the	  dashed	  green	  line	  in	  Fig.	  7,	  which	  is	  obtained	  from	  adding	  the	  social	  cost	  coming	  from	  having	  fewer	  flights	  together	  with	  the	  social	  cost	  generated	  by	  the	  total	  pollution	  emitted	  by	  those	  flights.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  when	  the	  operators	  will	  have	  internalized	  those	  social	  costs	  in	  its	  own	  production	  structures,	  the	  engines	  and	  the	  operations	  are	  expected	  to	  become	   much	   more	   efficient	   (EU	   ETS’s	   ultimate	   objective)	   up	   to	   the	   point	   that	   a	  natural	  equilibrium	  of	  total	  emissions	  will	  be	  reached	  considering	  the	  actual	  trade-­‐off	  between	   the	   socials	   benefits	   of	   flying	   and	   the	   social	   costs	   of	   having	   air	   polluted.	  Regulator	  must	  also	  be	  careful	  with	  fairness	   issues	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  setting	  pricing	  policies,	  thus	  reminding	  not	  to	  put	  too	  much	  relative	  pressure	  on	  weakest	  operators.	  	  	  Setting	   an	   optimum	   price	   for	   the	   emissions	   should	   lead	   to	   a	   social	   commitment	  scenario	  in	  which	  it	  could	  be	  possible	  to	  operate	  flights	  to	  cover	  social	  demand	  at	  the	  maximum	  extent,	  whereas	  the	  operations	  will	  be	  the	  most	  efficient	  for	  polluting	  the	  minimum	   (i.e.	   generating	   the	   lowest	   number	   of	   emissions).	   Only	   then	   the	   society	  could	  benefit	  from	  the	  air	  transport	  but	  without	  resigning	  to	  clean	  air	  welfare.	  	  	  	  Therefore	   the	  optimum	  price	  will	   be	   reached	  by	   the	   existence	  of	   a	   social	  Marginal	  
Rate	   of	   Substitution,	   where	   the	   society	   will	   renounce	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   the	  aggregated	  welfare	  (or	  aggregated	  utility)	  obtained	  by	  flying	  (thus	  polluting	  the	  air)	  to	  obtain	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  welfare	  that	  brings	  having	  clean	  air.	  	  	  The	   implementation	  of	   the	  proper	   formula	   (out	  of	   the	  scope	  of	   this	  project)	  will	  be	  the	   key	   tool	   to	   determine	   the	   price	   (i.e.	   incentive)	   that	   will	   exercise	   a	   natural	  
pressure	   on	   the	   airline	   operators	   to	   make	   them	   become	   more	   efficient	   (in	   this	  scenario	   we	   assume	   all	   the	   airline	   operators	   pays	   the	   same	   price	   per	   tonne	   of	  emission).	   The	   pressure	   will	   augment	   as	   soon	   as	   the	   emissions	   from	   an	   airline	  operator	  gets	  closer	  to	  the	  limit,	  and	  will	  be	  reduced	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  society	  considers	  that	  the	  levels	  of	  air	  cleanliness	  are	  enough	  compared	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  polluting	  for	  flying.	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But	   what	   is	   efficiency	   for	   an	   airline	   operator?	   Accepting	   the	   case	   when	   demand	  greatly	  increases	  and	  assuming	  equal	  efficiency	  levels	  (i.e.	  an	  operator	  produces	  100	  units	  then	  emits	  1	  tonne.	  If	  the	  production	  rises	  to	  200	  units	  then	  will	  emit	  2	  tonnes),	  the	   level	   of	   pollution	   highly	   increases.	   Therefore,	   if	   the	   airline	   operator	   greatly	  
increments	   its	   efficiency,	   if	   before	   100	   units	   emitted	   1	   tonne	   of	   emissions,	   now	  being	  twice	  as	  efficient,	  100	  units	  will	  emit	  half	  tonne	  (and	  200	  units,	  1	  tonne).	  	  	  Thus,	  efficiency	  is	  the	  relation	  between	  what	  an	  airline	  operator	  produces	  and	  
what	  the	  airline	  operator	  emits.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	  
	  
NO	  EFFICIENCY	  INCREMENT	  	  
	  
	  	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
	  	   UNITS	  PRODUCED	   	  	   PRICE	  per	  tonne	  (€)	   	  	   EMISSION	  (t)	   	  	  
	  	   100	  u.	  
	  	   5	  €	   	  	   1	  tonne	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   Scenario	  1	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	   EFFICIENCY	  INCREMENT	  	   	   	  	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
	  	   UNITS	  PRODUCED	   	  	   PRICE	  per	  tonne	  (€)	   	  	   EMISSION	  (t)	   	  	  
	  	   100	  u.	   	   2.5	  €	   	   0,5	  tonne	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
	  	   UNITS	  PRODUCED	   	  	   PRICE	  per	  tonne	  (€)	   	  	   EMISSION	  (t)	   	  	  
	  	   200	  u.	  
	  	   5	  €	   	  	   1	  tonne	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   Scenario	  2	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	  
Table	  5:	  Efficiency	  increment	  example	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If	   demand	   greatly	   increases	   and	   the	   same	   levels	   of	   efficiency	   are	  maintained	   as	   in	  scenario	  1	  from,	  the	  price	  per	  tonne	  of	  emission	  will	  exponentially	  increase	  (i.e.	  less	  distance	  with	  the	  hard-­‐constraint	  cap	  due	  to	  operators	  emit	  more)	  (Table	  5).	  	  	  However	  in	  scenario	  2	  where	  there	  is	  an	  efficiency	  increment	  by	  the	  airline	  operator,	  is	  possible	  to	  observe	  that	  the	  operator	  paying	  the	  same	  price	  per	  tonne	  of	  emission	  will	   emit	   less	   and	   produce	  more	   regarding	   the	   levels	   of	   production	   (i.e.	   operating)	  (Table	  5).	  Consequently,	  only	  adjusting	  the	  operator’s	  efficiency,	  these	  will	  gain	  more	  economic	  welfare	  due	  to	  a	  production	  increment	  under	  the	  same	  price.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  take	  into	  account	  when	  the	  Regulator	  fixes	  the	  price	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  emissions	   generated,	   it	   has	   repercussions	   to	   the	   air	   transport	   client	   (the	   one	   who	  finally	   internalizes	   the	   cost	   of	   flying).	   Therefore,	   what	   the	   Regulator	   is	   causing	  through	  the	  price	  increment	  is	  that	  some	  flights	  will	  lose	  its	  clients	  due	  to	  flying	  will	  not	  be	  affordable	   for	   them	  (i.e.	  not	  possible	   to	   internalize	   the	  cost).	  Thus,	   the	   flight	  will	  not	  be	  performed,	  fact	  that	  will	  generate	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  number	  of	  emissions.	  But,	  there	  will	  be	  some	  flights	  that	  will	  merely	  lose	  half	  of	  demand,	  so,	  the	  activity	  will	  still	  be	  performed	  and	  emissions	  will	  only	  be	  less	  reduced.	  	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  changing	  the	  model	  perspective,	  what	  will	  happen	  if	  there	  is	  an	  economic	  crisis	   in	  the	  European	  market?	  The	  first	  direct	  consequence	  of	  a	  crisis	  situation	   will	   be	   the	   loss	   of	   demand,	   i.e.,	   demand	   falls,	   airline	   operators	   emit	   and	  pollute	   less,	   fact	   that	  would	   generate	   a	  price	   decreasing	   due	   to	   emissions	   are	   far	  from	  the	  hard-­‐constraint	  cap.	  Thus,	  allows	  the	  Regulator	  to	  relax	  the	  pressure	  to	  be	  efficient	   on	   the	   airline	   operators.	   So	   probably,	   the	   airline	   operators	  would	   become	  less	  efficient,	  (due	  to	  the	  price	  to	  pay	  is	  much	  lower).	  That	  fact	  would	  not	  be	  a	  matter	  because	  it	  would	  let	  operators	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  crisis	  situation.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  the	  variable	  price	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  emissions	  generated	  would	  have	  to	  








5.	  CONCLUSION	  	  	  Before	   the	   EU	   ETS	   came	   into	   function	   airline	   operators	   produced/flown	   over	   any	  environmental	   restriction.	   Therefore,	   the	   EU	   ETS	   taking	   the	   role	   as	   a	   Regulator	  apparently	   established	   the	   price	   as	   an	   incentive	   so	   that	   airline	   operators	   could	  produce	   the	  same	   level	  of	  welfare,	  generating	   fewer	  costs	   in	  order	   to	   let	   the	  airline	  operator	  be	  aware	  (i.e.	   internalizing	  the	  cost)	  about	  the	  negative	  externalities	  of	  the	  pollution	  generated	  by	  their	  flights,	  since	  clean	  air	  is	  a	  limited	  benefit	  resource	  and	  it	  is	  very	  valued	  (even	  necessary)	  for	  the	  social	  welfare.	  	  	  After	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  main	  EU-­‐ETS	  aspects,	  as	  well	  as	  after	  the	  light	  shed	  over	  the	  underlying	  emission	  market	  dynamics,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  price	  to	  pay	   for	  
the	   extra	   emissions	   generated	   outside	   the	   EU	   ETS	   cap	  must	   be	   dynamic,	   not	  
static	   as	   it	   is	   now.	   In	   addition,	   price	   should	   be	   growing	   proportionally	   to	   the	  proximity	  to	  the	  hard-­‐constraint	  cap,	  a	  theoretical	  limit	  used	  in	  the	  analysis.	  However,	  the	  hard-­‐constraint	  cap	  must	  be	  real	  limit	  that	  should	  be	  calculated	  and	  which	  should	  not	  be	  exceeded	  due	  to	   the	  potential	  harmful	  effects	   to	   the	  society	  (emissions	  price	  should	  converge	  to	  infinite	  at	  the	  hard-­‐constraint	  cap	  border).	  	  	  	  Therefore,	  under	  a	  scenario	  of	  prosper	  and	  growing	  economy	  in	  which	  air	  transport	  shall	  be	  more	  demanded,	  airline	  operators	  must	  be	  gradually	  penalized	  with	  a	  higher	  emission	  price	  because	  a	  higher	  air	   traffic	  demand	  entails	  a	   increase	   in	   the	   level	  of	  emissions	   (except	   if	  new	   technological	  or	  procedural	   changes	  allows	  a	   reduction	  of	  emission	  per	  flight	  in	  the	  same	  proportion	  than	  the	  traffic	  increase).	  By	  dynamically	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increasing	  the	  price,	   the	  Regulator	  can	  generate	  a	  scenario	   for	  the	  operators	   in	  that	  they	  are	   forced	   to	  become	  more	   efficient	   in	   their	   operations.	  Of	  course,	  a	  higher	  price	  means	  a	  higher	  risk	  of	  losing	  the	  least	  efficient	  operators,	  thus	  reducing	  the	  EU-­‐wide	  traffic	  demand	  and	  losing	  the	  respective	  social	  utility	  related	  to	  such	  demand.	  	  	  However,	   if	   the	  emission	  price	   is	  set	  taking	   into	  consideration	  the	  market	  dynamics	  observed	  in	  this	  document,	  the	  level	  of	  demand	  utility	  finally	  lost	  should	  naturally	  be	  balanced	  with	  the	  level	  of	  utility	  obtained	  for	  a	  less	  polluted	  air.	   	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  under	  a	   scenario	  of	  economic	  crisis	   (with	   important	  air	   traffic	  demand	  reductions),	  the	   Regulator	   could	  diminish	   the	   pressure	   over	   the	   airline	   operators	   with	   the	  application	  of	  a	  lower	  the	  price	  that	  shall	  permit	  to	  relax	  the	  needs	  of	  being	  emission-­‐efficient	   for	   being	   competitive	   in	   the	   market	   of	   air	   transport,	   thus	   favouring	   the	  
survival	  of	  those	  companies	  that	  might	  be	  already	  punished	  by	  the	  crisis	  and	  in	  
turn	   favouring	   the	   recovery	   of	   the	   macro-­‐economy.	   Again,	   a	   dynamic	   price	  correctly	  set	  should	  lead	  to	  a	  equilibrium	  in	  which	  the	  benefits	  of	  flying	  for	  the	  society	  are	   naturally	   balanced	   with	   the	   benefits	   of	   having	   a	   cleaner	   air	   (equilibrium	  determined	  according	  to	  the	  aggregated/social	  marginal	  rate	  of	  substitution	  for	  those	  two	  goods).	  	  In	  other	  words;	  the	  variable	  emission	  price	  (or	  penalty)	  should	  be	  established	  by	  
the	  Regulator	  at	  any	  moment	  so	  that	  the	  marginal	  social	  benefit	  obtained	  by	  the	  
emissions	  reduction	  and	  the	  marginal	  social	  cost	  caused	  by	   less	  air	   traffic	  are	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